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Abstract: 
The flourishing synergy arising between organized crimes and the Internet has increased the insecurity of the 
digital world. How hackers frame their actions? What factors encourage and energize their behavior? These are 
very important but highly underresearched questions. We draw upon literatures on psychology, economics, 
international relation and warfare to propose a framework that addresses these questions. We found that 
countries across the world differ in terms of regulative, normative and cognitive legitimacy to different types of 
web attacks. Cyber wars and crimes are also functions of the stocks of hacking skills relative to the availability 
of economic opportunities. An attacking unit’s selection criteria for the target network include symbolic 
significance and criticalness, degree of digitization of values and weakness in defense mechanisms. Managerial 
and policy implications are discussed and directions for future research are suggested. 
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Article: 
1. Introduction 
Information and communications technologies (ICTs) have drastically increased the porosity between national 
borders (Rosenau, 1995). The increased porosity and anonymity
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 of the Internet superimpose in a complex 
interaction that enables criminal and violent groups, transnational terrorist organizations, and companies 
engaged in espionage to expand their operations globally. Government backed cyber-terrorism in some 
countries (Comité Européen Des Assurances, 2004) and maverick hackers testing their skills have further 
threatened the digital world. 
 
The flourishing synergy between organized crimes and the Internet (Williams, 2001) has thus increased the 
insecurity of the digital world. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports that cyber criminals have 
attacked almost all of the Fortune 500 companies.
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 According to the market research firm, International Data 
Corporation (IDC), 39% of Fortune 500 companies suffered a security breach in 2003 and 40% of global IT 
managers have rated security as their number one priority. Hackers have attacked computer networks of the 
Pentagon and the White House, NATO’s military websites and have stolen secret source codes of Microsoft and 
credit card numbers from a number of U.S. banks (Lunev, 2001; Walker, 2004). Cybercrime and cyber-
terrorism are currently the FBI’s No. 3 priority-behind counterterrorism and counterintelligence (Verton, 2002). 
 
With rapid digitization of businesses and increasing web attacks (Carblanc and Moers, 2003), organizations 
rightfully worry about the security of their networks. A deeper and richer understanding of the principles and 
purposes; necessary and sufficient conditions for web attacks (Coates, 2002); and the patterns of origin and 
targets would help managers as well as national and international policy makers devise strategies to combat 
such crimes. Nonetheless, no published study has addressed such an important issue. To fill the research gap 
and to initiate further academic discussion on this topic, we integrate streams of literatures from psychology, 
economics, warfare and international affairs to develop a model on the pattern of global cybercrimes. 
 
We define a cybercrime (or a cyber attack) broadly as any crime that employs a computer network in any phase 
of the crime. Examples of cybercrimes include critical infrastructure attack, fraud, online money laundering, 
criminal uses of Internet communications, ID fraud, use of computers to further traditional crimes and cyber 
extortions. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a brief survey of 
digital security threat. Then, we propose a model that explains sources, targets, motivations and types of web 
attacks. Finally, we provide discussions and implications. 
 
2. Digital security threat: a brief survey 
Estimating economic impacts of web attacks to a reasonable level of accuracy at the global level has been a 
challenge. Since many web attacks go unreported, such impacts tend to be underestimated. Triangulation of data 
from different sources indicates substantial economic losses of the global cyber attacks. The Council of Europe 
estimated the annual cost of repairing damages caused by computer viruses at $12 billion
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. In 2003, U.S. 
consumers and businesses lost over $14 billion in three categories of digital crimes (spam: $10 billion; cost of 
fraud to online merchants: $2 billion; fraudulent e-mails and websites designed to trick consumers to reveal 
personal information or phishing: $2 billion) (Swartz, 2004). More alarming perhaps is online credit card fraud. 
According to the FBI, 30 million credit card numbers were stolen through computer-security breaches during 
1999 –2003, resulting in $15 billion in losses (also see Box 2). The U.S. Secret Service calls credit card fraud 
"the bank robbery of the future".
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 What is more, a number of purely symbolic cyber attacks (e.g., those directed 
towards challenging some forms of ideologies) also entail significant economic losses.
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Who are the cyber attackers? A survey conducted among the members of the Confederation of British Industry 
indicated that the attackers in the most serious cybercrimes in 2000 were hackers (44.8%), former employees 
(13.4%), organized criminal groups (12.8%), current employees (11.5%), customers (7.9%), competitors 
(5.8%), political and protest groups (2.6%) and terrorists (1.4%) (BBC News 2001). A large proportion of such 
attacks are international in scope (Table 1). A 2002 survey of Australian firms indicated that foreign 
governments were perceived sources of attacks for 24% respondents and foreign corporate for 30% (Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, 2002). 
 
Although the US is the No. 1 source country for web attacks, its share in the global cybercrime industry is 
decreasing rapidly. The proportion of attacks originated from the US dropped from 58% in the second half of 
2003 to 37% in the first half of 2004 (Symantec, 2004). It should, however, be noted that the country of 
origination of a cyber attack is extremely fuzzy. Many cybercrimes originate in one country but are initiated by 
attacking units in different territories. For instance, in 1999, two members of a US-based "Phonemasters" were 
convicted for attacking the networks of U.S. telecomm companies. One of them downloaded thousands of 
Sprint calling card numbers that were sold to intermediaries in Canada and Switzerland and finally ended up 
with an organized group in Italy (Williams, 2001). Similarly, a hacker accused of pirating DirecTV and 
EchoStar signals in Florida told law enforcement authorities that he had received request from Afghanistan to 
provide hacking services (Lieberman, 2003). In the same vein, ShadowCrew, the international clearinghouse for 
stolen credit cards and identity documents, whose masterminds were arrested in the US in the mid-2005, had 
4000 members in a number of countries including Bulgaria, Canada, Poland, Sweden and the US (Grow and 
Bush, 2005). Likewise, Australian scammers have established links with Russian and Malaysian organized 
crime networks to transfer stolen money from overseas banks they have cracked into (Foreign Policy, 2005). 
 
Targeted web attacks are not limited to networks of large organizations. Such attacks accounted for 10% of total 
attacks in small businesses in the first half of 2004 compared to 3% in the second half of 2003 (Symantec, 2004, 
p. 17). 
 
Table 1 ranks the world’s top nations in terms of cyber attacks and frauds on the Internet. One estimate suggests 
that less than 1% of computer attacks originate in countries that the US considers breeding grounds for terrorists 
and hackers (The Economist, 2003). Another estimate suggests that 60% of fraudulent transactions originate 
from just 15 nations.
6
 
 
3. Pattern of the global cyber war and crime: a proposed model 
Our proposed model on the pattern of global cyber attacks is presented in Fig. 1. Although the model entails 
different levels of analysis, it helps us understand the mechanisms connecting sources and targets. In this 
section, we briefly discuss building blocks of the model. 
 
4. Characteristics of the source nation  
4. 1. Institutions 
An examination of institutions in which a hacking unit is embedded helps us to understand the sources of 
regulative, normative and cognitive legitimacy of hackers’ actions. Viewing from a rational perspective, 
institutions are mechanisms that provide efficient solutions to predefined problems (e.g., decision regarding 
involvement in hacking activities and choice of a website to attack) (Olson, 1965; Williamson, 1975). 
Institutions do so by helping align individual and collective interests. North (1990) defines institutions as 
macro-level rules of the game and thus distinguishes the players (organizations) from the rules (institutions) (p. 
27). The rules can be formal as well as informal. Scott (1995) has viewed institutions as composed of three 
broad categories: regulative, cognitive, and normative. Each set can be mapped with corresponding legitimacy 
concerns. 
 
4.2. Regulative institutions 
Regulative institutions consist of "explicit regulative processes: rule setting, monitoring, and sanctioning 
activities" (Scott, 1995, 35). In the context of this paper, regulative institutions consist of regulatory bodies 
(such as the U.S. Department of Justice) and existing laws and rules that influence computer hackers to behave 
in certain ways (Scott, 1995). In this section, we discuss the influence of regulative institutions in terms of rules 
and rule-making bodies. 
 
4.3. Rules (strength of rule of law) 
Cyber attacks have benefited from jurisdictional arbitrage. Ceteris paribus, the lack of a strong rule of law is 
associated with origination of more cyber attacks (see Boxes 1 and 2). Put differently, organized cybercrimes 
are initiated from countries that have few or no laws directed against cybercrimes and little capacity to enforce 
existing laws (Williams, 2001, also see Table 1). For instance, when a Filipino hacker launched the "Love 
Letter" virus in 2000, estimated loss of damage in the US was in the range of $4–15 billion. But the U.S. 
government could not do anything to prosecute the hacker or to recover the damages because at that time the 
Philippines had no laws prohibiting such crimes (Adams, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
A country with a strong rule of law, on the other hand, has "sound political institutions, a strong court system" 
and citizens that are "willing to accept the established institutions and to make and implement laws and 
adjudicate disputes" (International Country Risk Guide, 1996). Put differently, a strong rule of law is 
characterized by effective punishment to transgressors and sanctions against defectors and thus enhances the 
ability to successfully litigate fraudulent dealings on the Internet (Oxley and Yeung, 2001). A strong rule of 
laws thus provides negative motivations for hackers. 
 
Eastern Europe and Russia’s weak cybercrime laws have provided a fertile ground for computer crimes. 
Notwithstanding many Eastern Europe countries
12
 enactment of cybercrime laws, they lack enforcement 
mechanisms (see Box 1 for Russia). The discussion in this section is summarized as: 
 
Proposition 1. Ceteris paribus
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, the rate of origin of online attacks in an economy is negatively related to the 
strength of rule of laws applied to such attacks. 
 
4.4. Normative institutions 
Normative components introduce "a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life" (Scott, 
1995, 37). Practices that are consistent with and take into account the different assumptions and value systems 
of the national cultures are likely to be successful (Schneider, 1999). Cybercrimes are more justifiable in some 
societies compared to others. Blau (2004) describes how a Russian hacker-turned-teacher and his friends hacked 
programs and distributed them for free: "It was like our donation to society, it was a form of honor; [we were] 
like Robin Hood bringing programs to people". Similarly, many Indonesian hackers feel that cyber fraud is 
wrong but acceptable if the victim is from a developed country (see Box 2). 
 
Elements of normative institutions also include trade associations or professional associations that can use 
social obligation requirements to induce certain behavior within the hacking community. For instance, the 
members of the Honker Union of China (also known as the Red Hackers) are required to behave according to 
the guidelines set by the organization. We propose that: 
 
Proposition 2. The rate of origin of online attacks in an economy is positively related to the existence of social 
norms that justify such attacks. 
 
4.5. Cognitive institutions 
Cognitive institutions are associated with culture (Jepperson, 199 1). These components represent culturally 
supported habits that influence hackers’ behavior. In most cases, they are associated with cognitive legitimacy 
concerns that are based on subconsciously accepted rules and customs as well as some taken-for-granted 
cultural account of computer use (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Scott (1995, 40) suggests that "cognitive 
elements constitute the nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is made''. Cognitive programs 
affect the way people notice, categorize, and interpret stimuli from the environment. Although carried by 
individuals, cognitive programs are social in nature (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Compliance in the case of 
cognitive legitimacy concerns is due to habits; hackers may not even be aware that they are complying. 
 
4.6. Ideology
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Ideology is an important component of cognitive institutions that energizes the behavior of many computer 
hackers. A number of cyber attacks are linked with fights for ideology. Ideological hackers
15
 attack websites to 
further political purposes. As it will become clear shortly, such hackings can be mapped with obligation/ 
community-based intrinsic motivations. 
 
While some ideological hackers express nationalistic longings (see next section and Box 3) by acting up in line 
with the government (de Kloet, 2002), others act against the nation-state where they live. For instance, in the 
mid-2001, Cyberjihad, a group of hackers in Indonesia attacked the Web site of the Indonesian police to force 
them to free a militant Muslim leader (Antariksa, 2001, p. 15). Similarly, in October 2001, a hacker in China 
replaced a Chinese government website with pornographic contents (de Kloet, 2002). In addition to nationalism 
and religion, hackers’ interests are also framed by fight against global capitalism (de Kloet, 2002). Such hackers 
are likely to attack networks of big multinationals. 
 
 
Hackings by Islamic activists are also interesting examples of ideological cyber attacks. Except for occasional 
India–Pakistan and Israel–Palestine cyber wars, hacking by Islamist activists was insignificant before 
September 11, 2001. mi2g Intelligence Unit reported increasing Islamist hacking, the targets being networks of 
the US, Britain, Australia and other coalition partners as well as domestic networks of Russia, Turkey, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Kuwait.
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To take yet another example of ideological hacking, in June 1998, six hackers from the US, the UK, the 
Netherlands, and New Zealand (identifying themselves as Milworm) hacked the Web site of India’s Bhabha 
Atomic Research Center (BARC) and left a message: "If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to 
scream" (Denning, 2000). Similarly, in South Korea, 58 Internet servers were attacked by a Japanese student in 
November 2003 to protest the war in Iraq (Dukkun, 2003). 
 
Nationalism and patriotism
18,19 
can be considered as conceptual subsets of ideology. These are universally 
accepted as vital elements of state strength (Alagappa, 1995, 26–7). Salmon (1995) argues that "patriotism or 
attachment to one’s country often leads to actions and attitudes which are disinterested or self-sacrificing, help 
solve free-riding problems" (p. 296). We can find many instances of hackings linked to nationalism and 
patriotism. To take an example, in the early 1990s, a group of Portuguese hackers named TOXYN infiltrated a 
number of Indonesian government websites to fight against the occupation of East Timor (de Kloet, 2002). 
Indonesian hackers responded by attacking Portuguese servers that hosted the East Timor movement (Antariksa, 
2001). To take another example, in 1997, cyber attacks occurred in Sri Lanka in support of the Tamil Tiger 
separatists. The strike was intended to disrupt government communications by overloading Sri Lankan 
embassies with millions of e-mails (Havely, 2000). To take yet another example, in 1998, Indian army’s website 
on Kashmir was "hijacked" by supporters of Pakistan’s claim to the disputed territory, who plastered the site 
with their own political slogans (Havely, 2000). In response, in July 2001, the website of the Pakistan based 
militant outfit Lashkar-e-Tayiba was attacked by a hacker who called himself `True Indian' (Peer, 2001). It was 
in response to attacks of G-force, a Pakistani hacker group, to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ websites. 
 
Nationalism and patriotism were dominant codes of appeal in the US–China cyber wars of April–May 2001 (see 
Box 3). Quoting a security engineer from Guangdong Province of China, Netease
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 reported the daily number of 
attacks increased by over 20 times the average during April–May, 2001. Analyzing the US–China cyber wars, 
Kluver (2001, p. 8) concluded that "the technological optimism which sees in the Internet the end of nationalism 
and parochialism is an unrealistic understanding of how the Internet functions as a medium for human 
interaction". The next proposition is: 
 
Proposition 3. An organization’s conflict of ideology with a hacking unit is likely to result in cyber attacks by 
the latter against the former. 
 
5. Stock of hacking skills relative to the availability of economic opportunities 
Unlike conventional crimes against persons or property such as rape, burglary and murder, cybercrimes are very 
skill intensive. Stock of hacking skills is thus a prerequisite to online crimes. Whereas minimal skill is needed 
for opportunistic attacks, targeted attacks require more sophisticated skills. 
 
Crime rates are, however, tightly linked to the lack of economic opportunities. Becker (1995, p. 10) comments 
on the increased number of crimes committed by teenagers: ... [L]ow earnings are a factor behind crime, and 
teenagers have lower earnings and fewer opportunities. 
 
The combination of over-educated and under-employed computer experts has made Russia and some Eastern 
European countries fertile ground for hackers. In these counties, there are a large number of students good at 
mathematics, physics and computer science but having difficulties to find jobs (Blau, 2004). The situation was 
exacerbated by a financial crash in 1998 that left many computer programmers unemployed. A self-described 
hacker from Moscow told reporters: "Hacking is one of the few good jobs left here" (Walker, 2004). Regarding 
computer attacks originating from Romania, the US-based Internet Fraud Complaint Center, run by the FBI and 
the National White Collar Crime Center has reported: "Frustrated with the employment possibilities offered in 
Romania, some of the world’s most talented computer students are exploiting their talents online" (Romania 
Gateway, 2003). 
 
A large number of extortion related cyberattacks originate from Eastern Europe and Russia (see Box 1). These 
hackers possess capability to do very sophisticated attacks with limited computer power (Walker, 2004). It can 
be attributed to Russia’s highly educated workforce and programming skills.
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 Russian hackers have a deep 
understanding of networks and know how to "get in and out without a trace" (Walker, 2004). The above leads to 
the following: 
 
Proposition 4. The rate of origin of online crimes in an economy is positively related to the stock of hacking 
skills relative to the availability of economic opportunities. 
 
6. Types of cyber attacks 
Cyber attacks can be classified into two types: targeted and opportunistic attacks. In targeted attacks, specific 
tools are used against specific cyber targets. Opportunistic attacks, on the other hand, entail releasing worms 
and viruses that spread indiscriminately across the Internet. At this point, it must be emphasized that targeted 
attacks more dangerous than opportunistic attacks and many of them have bigger financial ramifications. 
Moreover, the proportion of cyber attacks that are targeted is increasing over time. 
Targeted attacks are carried out by skilled hackers with expertise to do serious damages. Some of them are 
motivated by financial gains (see Boxes 1 and 2). Targeted attacks are also initiated by terrorists, rival 
companies, ideological hackers or government agencies. The government of Burma, for instance, reportedly 
monitors online critics of the regime and sends them viruses attached in emails (Havely, 2000). Similarly, in 
August 2004, six hackers were convicted by a Californian court for their involvement in DoS attacks against 
business rivals (Leyden, 2004). 
 
7. Motivation 
A deeper understanding of web attacks requires an examination of motivation (Coates, 2002) that energizes the 
behavior of a hacking unit. The nature of web attacks allows us to draw an analogy with conventional wars. Just 
like in the physical world, wars on the web are fought for material ends as well as for intangible goals such as 
honor, dominance and prestige (Hirshleifer,1998). Drawing from psychology and economics literature, we 
divide these motivations into two categories. 
 
7.1. Intrinsic motivation 
The theory of intrinsic motivation is based on the premise that human need for competence and self-
determination are linked with interest and enjoyment (Deci and Ryan, 1985, 35). According to Ryan and Deci 
(2000), intrinsically motivated individuals do activities for "inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable 
consequence". They argue that "when intrinsically motivated, a person is moved to act for the fun or challenge 
entailed rather than because of external prods, pressures or rewards". Intrinsic motivation can be separated into 
two separate constituents: (1) enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation and (2) obligation/communitybased intrinsic 
motivation (Lindenberg, 2001). 
 
7.1.1. Enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation 
Central to the concept of intrinsic motivation is having fun or enjoying oneself when taking part in an activity 
(Deci and Ryan, 1985). Csikszentmihalyi (1975), one of the first psychologists to study the enjoyment 
dimension, emphasized that some activities were pursued for the sake of enjoyment derived from doing them. 
Csikszentmihalyi refers it to a satisfying flow of activity. Shapira (1976) argues that this category of motivation 
is related with fulfilling a challenging task without an external reward. Maverick hackers, for instance, attack 
websites because of the perceived challenges and without any desire for financial incentives. 
 
7.1.2. Obligation/community-based intrinsic motivation 
Lindenberg (2001) argues that acting on the basis of principle is also a form of intrinsic motivation. He argues 
that individuals may be socialized into acting appropriately and in a manner consistent with the norms of a 
group. The goal to act consistently within the norms of a group can trigger a normative frame of action (Lakhani 
and Wolf, 2005). The group to which hackers associate themselves could be a nation, a territory, a terrorist 
organization or an association of hackers. The obligation/community goal is strongest when gain seeking 
(gaining personal advantage at the expense of other group members) by individuals within the reference 
community is minimized (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005). 
 
7.2. Extrinsic motivation 
Economists have contributed to our understanding of how extrinsic motivations drive human behavior. 
Economic theory suggests that human behavior is a result of "incentives applied from outside the person" (Frey, 
1997, 13). The benefits accruing to the individual may be immediate or delayed. The amount of financial 
incentives and the amount of motivation driving a hacker's behavior co-vary positively. Extrinsically motivated 
hackers are thus likely to attack networks of companies with higher digitization of values (higher potential 
financial incentives). For instance, cyber extortionists target online casinos, banks, and e-commerce hubs. These 
attacks are carefully planned. After cracking into victims’ computers systems, extortionists normally send e-
mails demanding that ransoms as high as $100,000 be sent via money transfer agencies such as Western Union. 
Companies are threatened with sophisticated disruption of their computer systems if they do not comply. 
Although some victims reject demands for money and absorb cyber attack, other victims choose to pay (also see 
Box 1). 
7.3. Combination of motivations 
In many cases, human behavior is driven by multiple motivations—different forms of intrinsic and extrinsic 
(Lindenberg, 2001). Thus, a person who wants to make money and also have fun is likely to choose 
opportunities that give economic reward (ransom from hacking a e-commerce website) with a sense of having 
fun (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005). To take one example, the hackers protesting India’s nuclear weapons tests in 
1998 not only fought for ideology (community-based intrinsic motivation), but also admitted they attacked the 
website for thrills (enjoyment based intrinsic motivation) (Denning, 2000). The combination of motivations also 
changes over time. Blau (2004) quotes a Russian hacker: "There is more of a financial incentive [extrinsic 
motivation] now for hackers and crackers as well as for virus writers to write for money and not just for glory or 
some political motive [intrinsic motivation]". 
 
8. Profile of target organization 
8.1. Symbolic significance and criticalness 
The ideal targets for terrorists of September 11, 2001 were the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers, the White 
House and the Pentagon, the ones with tremendous symbolic significance (Coates, 2002). Hackers similarly 
have ideal targets. Attacks initiated by terrorists are likely to be targeted against decisive and critical 
infrastructure systems such as telecommunications, the supply of gas, oil and fuel (Comité Européen Des 
Assurances, 2004). 
 
Following the collision of an American spy plane and a Chinese jet in April 2001, Chinese and U.S. hackers 
attacked each other’s websites. Each camp selected websites that had symbolic values. In the US, the White 
House’s site was shut down for many hours; there was a virus attack against computers at the California 
Department of Justice; and Ohio’s Bellaire School District site played the Chinese national anthem displaying 
Chinese flag (Smith, 2001). In China, sina.com, one of the most popular portals; the website of Xinhua news 
agency; and those of local governments were attacked (The Happy Hacker, 2001). Thus, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 5. The symbolic significance and criticalness of a network increases its likelihood of being a 
cybercrime target. 
 
8.2. Digitization of value 
Crimes target sources of value, and for this reason, digitization of value is tightly linked with digitization of 
crime.
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 Large companies have larger networks which offer more targets to hackers. A survey of Riptech 
indicated that attackers are more likely to launch targeted attacks against larger companies than smaller. 
Businesses with a high dependence on digital technologies–including online casinos, banks, and e-commerce 
hubs–are more likely to be the target (Kshetri, 2005) for extrinsically motivated hackers. For instance, estimates 
suggest that a few hours downtime on Super Bowl weekend cost online casinos up to $1 million 
(Onlinecasinonews.com, 2004). According to IDC, over 60% of computer hacks targeted financial institutions 
in 2003 (Swartz, 2004). Similarly, in the first half of 2004, 16% of e-commerce attacks were targeted compared 
to 4% in 2003 (Symantec, 2004). Thus: 
 
Proposition 6. The degree of digitization of value of an organization increases its likelihood being a cybercrime 
target. 
 
8.3. Weakness of defense mechanisms 
Weakness of defense mechanism co-varies positively with the likelihood of an attack. In the conventional 
world, for instance, a female-headed household is positively related to the probability of being a crime target 
(Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). In the digital world, hackers in most cases take advantage of unfixed software 
holes. Due to weak defenses of most computer networks, it is difficult track origins of cyber attacks (Kong and 
Swartz, 2000). Based on the above, a final proposition pertaining to the likelihood of an organization’s network 
being attacked is: 
 
Proposition 7. Weakness of defense mechanisms of a network is positively related to its likelihood of being a 
cybercrime target. 
 
9. Discussion and implications 
This paper has contributed to the conceptual and empirical understanding of global cyber wars and crimes. The 
analyses of the paper indicated that the nature of the source of a web attack is a function of the nature of 
regulative, normative and cognitive legitimacy to the attacking unit; and stocks of hacking skills relative to the 
availability of economic opportunities. An attacking unit’s selection criteria for the target include symbolic 
significance and degree of digitization of values. Extrinsically motivated hackers are likely to attack the 
networks with high degree of digitization of values. These include financial institutions, e-commerce hubs and 
online casinos. Intrinsically motivated hackers’ targeted attacks, on the other hand, are directed towards 
organizations that with symbolic significance and criticalness. These include websites of government, critical 
infrastructures and also some companies that are perceived as national symbol. Different motivations of 
hackers, source characteristics and target country characteristics lead to different likelihoods of attacks on 
different organizations. Put differently, an independent variable may have different coefficients in regressions 
with attacks on different organizations as dependent variables. 
 
Nations across the world differ widely on key elements represented in Fig. 1 and hence on domestic/foreign 
composition of sources and targets of cyber attacks as well as attackers' motivations. To illustrate from the U.S. 
perspective, in Table 2, we have classified targeted cyber attacks impacting the US by national border in terms 
of target and source. 
 
This paper has important managerial implications. First, the global cybercrime landscape is moving toward a 
higher proportion of targeted attacks. All organizations, however, are not equally attractive cybercrime targets. 
Whereas symbolic significance and criticalness of a network attract intrinsically motivated cyber criminals, 
larger businesses and those with a high dependence on digital technologies are lucrative targets for hackers that 
work for money. It is thus important for firms to assess the risks of their networks being cybercrime targets and 
devise appropriate defense mechanisms. 
 
Second, like other technologies, deployment of defense mechanisms tends to diffuse from large to small 
organizations. This is commonly known as the rank effect in economics literature (Gotz, 1999). As large 
companies put stronger defense mechanisms against cyberattacks, small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) 
are more likely to become cybercrime targets. The proportion of total cybercrimes that target SMEs is thus 
likely to increase. 
 
Third, cybercrimes are among the most underreported forms of criminality. Experts say less than 10% of 
cybercrimes are reported to authorities (Bednarz, 2004). In the conventional world, research has indicated that 
time taken to report a crime is one of the most important factors in determining the probability of arrest 
(National Institute of Justice, 2001). Timely reporting of cyberattacks to authorities is thus likely to strengthen 
the rules of law and help combat cyber threats in the long run. 
 
 
Fourth, some companies have set a dangerous precedent of negotiating with web terrorists by paying ransoms. 
Estimates suggest that gambling sites alone have paid millions of dollars to cyber extortionists annually. 
Ransom money sends positive cognitive messages and will fuel further cyberattacks by making criminals more 
sophisticated and organized. As criminals’ skill, organization and intelligence co-vary positively with the odds 
of getting away with crimes (National Center for Policy Analysis, 2002), paying ransom contributes to the 
vicious circle of cybercrimes. 
 
This paper also has several policy implications. First, there is no pure technological fix for security related 
problems involving technologies (Carblanc and Moers, 2003, Skolnikoff, 1989). Cooperation and collaboration 
among national governments, computer crime authorities and businesses are critical to combat cyber attacks. If 
national governments work with one another as well as with business communities to modify institutions by 
defining appropriate policies for the security of the digital world, it will result in lower transaction costs. Some 
signs of success have materialized,
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 but nations have very far to go before they can achieve even a moderate 
level of success. For instance, although Russia has signed agreements to help the US in investigating some 
crimes, computer crimes are not among them (Lemos, 2001). In 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice requested 
the assistance of Russian authorities but received no response (Lemos, 2001). 
 
Second, enacting laws that require organizations to deploy appropriate defense mechanisms and making 
reporting of cybercrimes mandatory can help combat such crimes. U.S. government, for instance, requires 
commercial banks to secure their networks. The Patriot Act and the Gramm Leach Bliley (GLB) Act require new 
security measures including customer identification and privacy protection. Despite the existence of similar 
regulations for decades, the Patriot Act reflected a change in the U.S. banking landscape. Since the mid-2004, 
South Korea’s National Cyber Security Center has mandated that all Internet-related hacking incidents must be 
reported (Ho, 2004). Many countries, however, do not have such laws. 
 
Third, many countries are changing the regulative landscape towards severity of punishment. For instance, the 
U.S. Patriot Act brought cyber attacks into the definition of terrorism with penalties of up to 20 years in prison. 
The probability of arrest in cybercrimes is, however, very low since conventional law enforcement authorities 
lack skills required in dealing with such crimes. The severity of punishment is important, but what is still more 
critical in enhancing cyber safety is the certainty of punishment (Becker, 1995). The probability of arrest is 
likely to increase with more investments in the development of law enforcement capabilities. 
 
Fourth, many small and poor countries lack resources to investigate cybercrimes (see Box 2). Big and rich 
nations’ assistance to these countries, especially those with high rates of origin of cybercrimes, is urgently 
needed to combat global cyber threats originating from these countries. 
 
Finally, various components of institutions, despite their connotation of persistence (Parto, 2005), durability 
(Hodgson, 2003) and stability (Scott, 2001, p.48), are subject to change in evolutionary time (Parto, 2005). 
Zucker (1988, p. 26) draws an analogy from physics to describe institutional change mechanisms. He argues 
that institutions continuously undergo change due to entropy, a tendency toward disorder or disorganization (p. 
26). An implication of the entropy-like characteristics is that people can modify and reproduce (Scott, 2001) 
institutions. Managers and governmental officials thus can singly or cooperatively eliminate or at least 
minimize institutional forces that promote deviant cyber behavior.
24
 In addition to enacting new laws to 
minimize cyber threats (change in regulative institutions), they can devise strategy to change social norms 
(change in normative institutions) that influence hackers’ behavior. 
 
An important area of future research concerns operationalizing the constructs discussed in this paper and testing 
the model presented in Fig. 1. Two possible approaches can be employed for this purpose. The first approach 
entails testing the model based on country-level data. Although Fig. 1 employs different levels of analysis, 
sources and target characteristics can be aggregated at the country level. For this purpose, Table 3 provides 
some measures of cyber safety and a non-exhaustive list of factors that reflect and determine the cyber safety 
environment. 
 
The second approach is to apply economics of crimes to test the influence of characteristics of the source nation 
on hackers’ willingness to commit cybercrimes. Following the economic approach, a cyber criminal weighs 
benefits and costs to make decision about engaging in a crime. A cybercrime is thus committed if the sum of 
perceived monetary benefits and perceived psychic benefits exceeds perceived psychic costs of committing a 
cybercrime plus the expected penalty effect (which is the product of the probability of arrests, the probability of 
conviction and perceived monetary opportunity costs of conviction) (Probasco and Davis, 1995). Surveys 
consisting of impacts of regulative, normative and cognitive institutions; and availability of economic 
opportunities on hackers’ assessment of perceived cost–benefit of cybercrimes can be employed to test the 
model presented in Fig. 1. Respondents could be hackers and/or computer network experts from a number of 
countries. Similarly, surveys can also be conducted to predict profiles of target organization that different 
categories of hackers consider worthwhile to attack. 
 
Preliminary evidence discussed in this paper indicates the shift in hackers’ motivations from intrinsic to 
extrinsic. In this regard, another fruitful avenue for future research is to understand the determinants of the 
turning point. In-depth interviews with extrinsically motivated hackers would help understand how institutional 
and economic factors discussed in this paper transform motivations of attacking computer networks. 
As mentioned above, all companies do not report attacks on their networks. Additional research is also needed 
to identify the determinants of self-selection bias in the reporting of cyber attacks. What factors distinguish 
firms that report attacks on their networks from those that do not? Are there international variations in the 
reporting patterns? 
 
Notes: 
1 Unlike in the traditional warfare, it is almost impossible to identify the attacker in the IT warfare. Victims 
may not know whether an attacker is a teenager or terrorist, a rival company or a foreign government. In the 
famous Storm Cloud case, for instance, U.S. officials were not able to determine whether a foreign government 
or maverick hackers were involved (Bridis, 2001). 
2 See "Reducing On-line Credit Card Fraud," Web Developers Journal, 
http://www.webdevelopersjournal.com/articles/ card_fraud.html, 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2002/june2002/june02leb.htm (accessed February 27, 2005). 
3 See Cyber Terrorism: The Growing Threat, 
http://www.ecssr.ac.ae/CDA/en/FeaturedTopics/DisplayTopic/0,1670,296, 00.html. 
4 Fraud prevention for the online enterprise, http://www.quova.com/solutions/internet-fraud-detection.shtml. 
5 For instance, hackers that attacked India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) network in 1998 also 
downloaded thousands of pages of e-mail and research documents and erased huge amount of data (Denning, 
2000). 
6 Fraud prevention for the online enterprise, http://www.quova.com/solutions/internet-fraud-detection.shtml. 
7Hackers—the newbreed of gangsters, August 3, 2004, http://newpaper.asia1.com.sg/top/story/0,4136,69503-1-
1098892740,00. html. 
8 Also see 
http://members.optushome.com.au/cmrc/files/AFM/Law%20in%20the%20digi/THE_PROSECUTION_OF_ 
COMPUTER_.rtf. 
9 Hackers—the new breed of gangsters, August 3, 2004, http://newpaper.asia1.com.sg/top/story/0,4136,69503-
1- 1098892740,00.html. 
10 There are two categories of DoS attacks: Operating System (OS) attacks, and Network attacks. OS attacks 
entail discovering holes in the security of the OS and bringing down the system. Network attacks disconnect a 
network from the Internet services provider (ISP). The attackers use mis-configured networks to perform such 
attacks (See "Help! I am being DoS’edQ at http://www.irc-junkie.org/ content/a-DoS.php). 
11 Online casinos rely on Worldpay to process customer’s transactions and pay off gamblers (Walker, 2004). 
14 Ideology is defined as the taken-for-granted assumptions, beliefs and value systems shared collectively by 
social groups (Simpson, 1993). The American Heritage Dictionary, third edition, defines ideology as "the body 
of ideas reflecting the social needs and aspirations of an individual, a group, a class, or a culture". 
15 Hacking (Beginner): Hackers Explained (PART I), 
www.linuxexposed.com/modules.php?op=modload&name= News&file=article&sid=528. 
16 Archaeology is the study of ancient societies and cultures. Paleoanthropology is the study of the human 
fossil record. 
17 The rise of extremist hacking, criminal syndicates, http://star-
techcentral.com/tech/story.asp?file=/2004/10/26/ technology/9225925&sec=technology. 
18 Before proceeding further, it is important to review definitional issues and difference in the meanings of the 
two terms. One school of thought maintains that "there is a distinction, but no real difference" between 
patriotism and nationalism (Pei, 2003). According to this school, patriotism is related with "allegiance to one’s 
country" and nationalism as "sentiments of ethno-national superiority" (Pei, 2003). Brown (1999) considers 
patriotism as identification with territory whereas nationalism as identification with the group. For the purpose 
of this paper, we use the terms nationalism and patriotism interchangeably. 
19 There are some studies that have compared the impacts of nationalism and patriotism on consumer behavior. 
In a comparative study of the impact of patriotism and nationalism on consumer ethnocentrism in Turkey and 
the Czech Republic, Balabanis et al. (2001) found that the impact of patriotism and nationalism on consumer 
ethnocentrism is not consistent across the two countries. Consumer ethnocentrism in Turkey is fueled by 
patriotism, and in the Czech Republic by nationalism. 
20 See http://news.163.com/editor/010501/010501_168631.html. 
21 Hackers—the new breed of gangsters, August 3, 2004, 
http://newpaper.asia1.com.sg/top/story/0,4136,69503-1- 1098892740,00.html. 
22 Bernard Clements, Laurent Beslay and Duncan Gilson, Cyber-Security Issues 
http://www.jrc.es/home/report/english/ articles/vol57/EDI1E576.htm. 
23 To take an example, Interpol played a critical role to catch a member of Cyber Lords in Japan. To take 
another example, over 60 Romanian hackers were arrested in joint operations involving the FBI, Secret Service, 
Scotland Yard, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and a number of European police agencies (Romania 
Gateway, 2003). To take yet another example, in July 2004, collaboration between British and Russian police 
led to the arrest of the members of an online extortion ring accused of blackmailing online sports betting 
websites that cost British companies $120 million (sophos.com, 2004). 
24 The author thanks a JIM reviewer for suggesting this point. 
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